UK workplace lockdown plans: when to lock down

Locking the front door does not make a workplace safe during every emergency. A workplace lockdown plan should explain when restricting access reduces danger, when evacuation or invacuation is safer, and who makes that decision.

The response depends on the threat, the building and the people present. A procedure that protects staff against violence outside may expose them to greater danger if an attacker is already inside.

Start with safe movement, then assign the controls, responsibilities and communications needed to support it.

Key takeaways

• Choose evacuation, invacuation or lockdown according to the threat and site-specific risk assessment; some incidents require a combination.
• Give a named incident lead authority to activate the plan, with deputies covering absences, evenings and weekends.
• Use a lockdown warning that is clearly different from the fire alarm, with accessible messages and a fallback communication method.
• Staff facing immediate danger should follow Run, Hide, Tell rather than wait for management approval or a building-wide announcement.
• Security restrictions must remain compatible with safe escape, accessible assistance and emergency-service access.
• End a police-led lockdown only after confirmation from attending officers and an authorised all-clear, then record decisions and close the gaps identified during review.

A written policy establishes expectations. A tested procedure establishes whether the right people can carry them out.

Choose between evacuation, invacuation and lockdown

The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) identifies three primary protective responses: evacuation, invacuation and lockdown. A combination may provide the safest response as circumstances develop.

These are different decisions about movement. They should not become interchangeable labels on an emergency notice.

Evacuation moves people away from danger

Evacuation takes people out of the affected premises or area using a safe route. Fire, structural damage or an internal security threat may require evacuation, although the route and destination depend on the incident.

The normal fire assembly point may be unsuitable during violence, a suspicious-item incident or a threat affecting the surrounding street. Identify alternatives before they are needed.

Directional evacuation can move occupants away from one affected entrance whilst other parts of the site remain secured. The instruction must identify which route is safe, rather than simply telling everyone to leave.

Invacuation and lockdown protect people inside

Invacuation moves people into safer internal areas when remaining outside or leaving would increase exposure. It may involve moving staff away from glazing, external doors or an affected courtyard.

Lockdown secures all or part of the premises to restrict access and reduce exposure to a life-threatening security threat. It can happen before or after invacuation.

NPSA warns against hard-and-fast rules. If conditions change and evacuation becomes safer, decision-makers on the ground should change the response.

ProtectUK’s guidance on tested lockdown procedures supports planning these arrangements together. A locked entrance provides limited protection if occupants have been directed towards danger elsewhere.

Recognise the circumstances that justify lockdown

Lockdown is appropriate when restricting access or movement offers better protection than ordinary evacuation. The decision should identify where the threat is, who is exposed and which routes remain usable.

A concerning report requires assessment. It does not automatically justify securing every part of the building.

A threat outside may justify restricting entry

A workplace violence incident near an entrance, a credible threat against the premises or officers’ activity immediately outside may justify a preventative lockdown. External doors can be secured whilst people move away from exposed areas.

Record the report’s source and location. Distinguish something directly observed from a message forwarded through several people.

A general warning about crime in the district may require greater vigilance rather than lockdown. The decision should follow the credible exposure at the particular site.

Consider arrivals as well as people already inside. Staff travelling to work, delivery drivers and customers need instructions that prevent them approaching the affected entrance.

A threat inside requires local decisions

An attacker inside the building changes the purpose of protective measures. Locking the perimeter may not protect people sharing the attacker’s space.

Some occupants may have a safe escape route. Others may need to secure individual rooms or move into protected zones.

A suspicious item or bomb threat also requires its own assessment and police advice. Lockdown should not leave people close to the suspected hazard. ProtectUK’s bomb threat checklist supports recording the information needed for police assessment.

Do not send staff to investigate a threat simply to obtain a more complete report. Act on available information without creating another exposure.

Understand the four lockdown methods

NPSA identifies four access-control methods. They explain how access is controlled, rather than establishing four levels of danger.

The selected method must fit the doors, escape arrangements, staffing and threat location.

Match the method to the building

The distinction matters when selecting door controls and writing instructions.

These methods can overlap. A site may secure its main entrances whilst applying separate restrictions to an affected floor.

Other guidance uses different categories

Toronto’s workplace framework uses Shelter-in-Place for an external environmental threat, Hold and Secure for a threat outside or nearby, and Full Lockdown for a physical threat inside.

Australian training provider First 5 Minutes distinguishes preventative lockdown, where the threat is nearby but not yet inside, from emergency lockdown following an on-site incident. The latter may involve securing individual rooms.

These descriptions are useful comparisons, not UK statutory categories. Shelter-in-place may require environmental controls, such as ventilation decisions, that differ from protection against an attacker.

Define local terminology by its required action. Staff should understand whether an instruction means secure external doors, move to an internal area, avoid a particular zone or take immediate cover.

Separate legal duties from recommended practice

Employers have duties to assess relevant risks and provide suitable information, instruction, training and emergency arrangements. A document titled “lockdown policy” does not, by itself, establish compliance.

The applicable legal framework depends on jurisdiction, premises use and the circumstances of the organisation.

Build lockdown into existing safety arrangements

In Great Britain, the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 include requirements concerning procedures for serious and imminent danger. Northern Ireland has its own corresponding framework.

Fire-safety duties also differ across UK jurisdictions. Emergency security arrangements must work alongside the applicable fire precautions, rather than displacing them.

GOV.UK’s fire safety and evacuation requirements address usable escape routes and evacuation arrangements. Door-security decisions need competent assessment where they affect those functions.

NPSA and ProtectUK recommendations provide operational guidance. They are not a universal legal checklist, and a recommended exercise interval should not be described as a statutory requirement.

Restrict access without assuming powers to detain

Lockdown can restrict movement within a site, entry and exit. Those operational controls do not give employers general authority to contain people against their will.

Mental Health Act powers and the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards operate within defined legal arrangements. They are not ordinary workplace lockdown powers, nor are they the only legal provisions relevant to detention.

Two-way restrictions therefore need particular care. Obtain competent fire-safety and legal advice where a proposed arrangement could prevent people leaving.

Explain protective instructions clearly, but do not improvise physical detention. Staff should understand the immediate danger and the available safe options without being given misleading claims about management authority.

Build a workplace lockdown plan around site risks

Assess how the premises actually operate, including deliveries, public access, shared routes, lone working and reduced staffing. A floor plan shows physical space; it does not show every operational dependency.

Use a business security risk assessment to identify credible threats and assign proportionate controls.

Examine the routes people would use

Walk entrances, stairs, loading areas and internal connections. Identify exposed glazing, doors that cannot be secured locally, inaccessible internal spaces and routes shared with neighbouring occupiers.

Check whether a proposed safe area has sufficient capacity, an accessible approach and reliable communication. A room should not be designated because it happens to have a lock.

NPSA’s guidance on venue entry and exit addresses risks around these transition points. Queues and arrival patterns can change the exposure outside an otherwise secure building.

Test the dependencies behind each control

Record what happens when power, network connectivity or access-control software fails. Identify which doors release, which remain secured and how occupants escape.

Keep emergency contacts and essential site information available offline. Assign responsibility for keys, approved overrides, torches and backup communications.

Inspect emergency lighting, fire doors and escape routes through the relevant maintenance arrangements. A lockdown exercise should not conceal defects already affecting ordinary evacuation.

Review the assessment after layout changes, new access systems, altered opening hours or significant changes in occupancy.

Assign authority before an incident starts

Give one named role responsibility for coordinating the response. “Management will decide” leaves uncertainty when the manager is absent or several tenants share the building.

Some organisations use Chief Warden or Emergency Control Organisation terminology. UK workplaces may use incident lead, duty manager or building emergency coordinator instead.

Assign responsibilities according to function, with deputies for each operating period.

The incident lead should coordinate accountability and record unresolved locations, not demand a perfect headcount before calling police. HSE’s incident and emergency planning guidance, written for events, also highlights coordinated emergency arrangements and shared plans.

Security officers support the response within their training. Written security guard evacuation duties should fit the wider emergency plan, without assigning police or firefighting functions to guards.

Delegation must cover immediate activation. A trained deputy should be able to act on a credible threat without waiting for an unavailable director.

Signal lockdown without using the fire alarm

Use a warning that staff can distinguish immediately from the evacuation signal. Suitable arrangements may combine a voice announcement, dedicated alert system, desktop notification, text message or accessible visual warning.

The technology should support a clear instruction. An unexplained tone or coded phrase may leave visitors unable to act.

State the action and affected area

A message should identify the protective response, its scope and what recipients should do next. Include the location of danger only where sufficiently reliable and safe to communicate.

For an assessed external threat, a short announcement could state:

“Lockdown. Secure external access. Move away from external doors and windows. Do not approach reception. Follow further instructions through the emergency alert system.”

This wording is unsuitable if the threat is already inside the affected area. Prepare separate messages for different scenarios rather than forcing every incident into one script.

Keep all-clear wording distinct from an update. A message that an entrance remains closed should not be mistaken for permission to move elsewhere.

Give communication a fallback

Assign one update owner and one time-stamped incident log. Record what is known, what remains uncertain and which instruction is current.

Use more than one channel where practicable, but avoid systems that all depend on the same network or power supply. Test whether alerts reach toilets, plant rooms, outdoor areas and staff without company phones.

Consider whether audible announcements or device alerts could reveal hiding locations during an internal attack. The communication method must suit the threat.

A message marked “sent” establishes transmission, not understanding. Exercises should examine whether recipients recognised and followed it.

Give staff a short, usable action sequence

Staff need instructions they can apply without reading a lengthy policy during danger. The sequence should support immediate judgement rather than require everyone to reach the same room.

ProtectUK’s Run, Hide, Tell (run hide tell) guidance applies to firearms and weapons attacks. Run if there is a safe route, hide if escape is not possible, and tell police when safe.

For occupants whose safest option is to secure their current area:

1. Move away from the immediate threat without crossing an exposed route or returning for belongings.
2. Lock or secure the door where possible, without exposing anyone to the threat.
3. Turn off lights where safe, stay out of sight and keep away from doors and windows.
4. Silence phones and other devices, including vibration, and stop unnecessary sound.
5. Stay low and quiet where appropriate, whilst retaining awareness of usable escape options.
6. Call 999 when safe and follow officers’ instructions, reporting the location and information actually known.

The lock, light and sound checks support concealment. They do not establish that a room provides protection against weapons, smoke or another hazard.

Do not open a secured door merely because someone knocks or claims authority. Use the site’s agreed verification arrangements and follow identifiable police instructions.

Staff should not leave a secure location to search for colleagues or collect a visitor register. Report unresolved people and likely locations through the agreed channel when safe.

Resolve fire-alarm conflicts in advance

Do not activate the fire alarm as a substitute lockdown signal during an active threat. It may send occupants into corridors, entrances or assembly areas affected by the attacker.

That instruction concerns signalling a security incident. It does not remove the need to report and respond to a real fire.

Write a combined-threat procedure

A blanket rule to ignore every fire alarm during lockdown is unsafe. A blanket rule to use the normal evacuation route regardless of a known attacker is also unsafe.

The fire-risk assessment and security plan should address simultaneous alarms, credible smoke or fire, compromised routes and emergency-service instructions.

Occupants need usable options if their current location becomes dangerous. A changing incident may require moving away from both the original security threat and a new fire hazard.

London Fire Brigade’s workplace emergency-plan guidance supports defined evacuation arrangements. Combined-threat planning should be developed with competent fire-safety advice, not improvised during a drill.

Preserve escape and responder access

Check the interaction between door locks, fire-alarm interfaces, emergency releases and power failure. Record the intended operation and test it under controlled conditions.

Lockdown arrangements should never be designed to obstruct prompt escape when escape is necessary. International workplace guidance, including Toronto’s framework, makes that limitation explicit.

Do not disable fire detection, emergency lighting or escape hardware to make a security procedure easier to operate.

Staff also need to know which routes remain available if the usual corridor cannot be used. Familiarity with one exit is insufficient where that exit is affected by the threat.

Make procedures accessible to everyone present

Accessible emergency planning requires more than placing a notice at wheelchair height. People must be able to receive the warning, understand it and reach an appropriate place of safety.

Assess assistance needs with the people concerned. Do not assume a diagnosis establishes what someone can or cannot do.

Provide accessible warnings and safe locations

Combine suitable audible, visual and written messages according to the workforce and premises. Consider hearing loss, visual impairment, language needs, learning disabilities and people unfamiliar with the building.

Internal protective locations should have accessible routes and sufficient space. A room reached only by stairs cannot be the sole planned option for everyone.

A Personal Emergency Evacuation Plan addresses evacuation needs. Lockdown and invacuation may require additional arrangements because the destination, route and protective action are different.

Include accessible welfare needs where an incident may last for an extended period.

Assign assistance without unsafe improvisation

Name assistance roles and deputies, then explain their limits. Staff should not improvise manual handling or enter an exposed area beyond their training.

Include visitors with temporary injuries, contractors unfamiliar with the layout and people separated from their usual support.

Education settings should also apply the government’s protective security guidance for education settings, alongside their own safeguarding and emergency arrangements.

Test the actual route and message. A written assurance that assistance will be available provides limited evidence if the assigned colleague works a different shift.

Include visitors, shared premises and lone workers

The plan should cover everyone exposed to the incident, not only permanent staff appearing on the HR system. Visitor records, contractor attendance and delivery arrangements support accountability, but none provides a complete picture alone.

Coordinate visitors and neighbouring occupiers

Give visitor hosts responsibility for explaining immediate instructions and reporting known locations. Customers and delivery drivers may need direct guidance because they cannot access internal alerts.

Consider bringing people inside only where doing so is assessed as safe. Nobody should leave cover or open a threatened entrance to carry out a routine reception task.

In multi-tenanted buildings, agree the building-wide lead, shared-door controls, notification channels and responsibility for common areas. One tenant’s instruction must not send people into another tenant’s restricted zone.

Use routine office security checks to maintain visitor and access arrangements between exercises. Emergency controls depend partly on the accuracy of ordinary procedures.

Protect lone, mobile and out-of-hours staff

Record expected locations, contact times and escalation arrangements for lone workers. Identify who acts after a missed check and what happens if the first responder is unavailable.

A worker unable to answer safely should not receive repeated loud calls that reveal their location. Agree discreet options where suitable and test their delivery.

Mobile staff need instructions to avoid the affected site, not an automatic requirement to return for accounting.

Reduced staffing also changes what can be achieved. A lone guard cannot secure several entrances, guide visitors and meet police simultaneously. The plan should establish priorities and explain how unsupported tasks are reported.

Give emergency services clear information and access

Call 999 for an immediate threat to life. Do not delay the call whilst seeking management approval, completing a headcount or trying to identify every person involved.

UK procedures should state 999 clearly. Imported Australian templates may use Triple Zero (000), which should not remain in UK workplace instructions.

Report observations and uncertainties separately

Provide the full address, building name, floor or zone and nature of the emergency. Explain the last known threat location, direction of movement, weapons observed, casualties and approximate number of occupants.

Distinguish direct observations from reports supplied by others. State when the information was obtained and what remains unknown.

Explain locked entrances, safe access possibilities and the location of anyone needing assistance. Keep listening to the call handler and follow their instructions.

Do not collect photographs or approach the threat to improve the report.

Prepare a safe responder handover

Keep current plans, access information and relevant hazards available to authorised responders. Identify a safe liaison point only where circumstances permit.

Do not send a guard outside to meet police through an exposed entrance. Remote liaison may be the safer option.

Official guidance on responding to armed police advises following officers’ instructions, avoiding sudden movements and keeping hands visible.

Police may initially move past casualties or staff to address the threat. Occupants should follow instructions rather than approach officers unexpectedly or attempt to direct the operational response.

Put seven practical elements in the written plan

A small workplace may need a concise document rather than a large emergency manual. It still needs enough detail to assign decisions and make the controls work.

There is no universal UK rule requiring exactly seven lockdown-plan headings. The following structure groups the operational information into manageable parts.

1. Define the premises, operating hours, credible threats, risk-assessment findings and circumstances requiring evacuation, invacuation or lockdown.
2. Assign activation authority, deputies, emergency-service contact, communications, access control and responsibility for occupant information.
3. Identify protective areas, affected doors, safe routes, alternative routes, accessibility arrangements and responder access.
4. Record the warning signals, approved messages, communication channels, update arrangements and fallback methods.
5. Give staff, visitors, contractors and lone workers short instructions suited to their location and immediate danger.
6. Explain fire-alarm conflicts, power loss, system failure, medical needs, all-clear authority and controlled release.
7. Set arrangements for training, exercises, records, welfare, business continuity and review after change or incident.

The policy should explain what should be done and why. The procedures should state who acts, in what order and through which system.

Keep public-facing instructions separate from sensitive operational details, such as override arrangements and security-system information. Access should match the reader’s role.

Connect the document to the wider security incident response plan. Lockdown may protect occupants during the immediate incident, whilst closure, remote working and service recovery require separate decisions.

Give the approved version an owner and review date. Remove superseded instructions where staff might still rely on them.

Follow a decision sequence, not a fixed timetable

The first report rarely contains everything needed for a complete assessment. The response must allow protective action, police contact and information gathering to happen in parallel where staffing permits.

The following sequence shows the required handovers. It does not set response-time targets or assume every incident develops in the same order.

The incident lead should reassess whenever new information affects the chosen response. A threat moving inside, smoke entering a protected area or a failed door may require an immediate change.

Accountability should develop alongside protection. Record confirmed locations, people known to be off site and unresolved names without sending staff into danger to complete a register.

Keep decisions in one time-stamped log. Separate departmental notes can support it, but competing records make later reconstruction harder.

If the site remains unavailable, record who authorises closure, notifies staff, contacts relevant providers and starts continuity arrangements.

Control the all-clear and support recovery

Silence does not establish that the danger has ended. Neither does an unlocked door, a social-media post or a colleague deciding to leave.

For a police-led security lockdown, the incident lead or Chief Warden should authorise the words “all clear” only after police confirm it is safe to do so.

Release people through controlled instructions

State which areas can move, which routes are available and which restrictions remain. Reuse the recognised communication channels, with a fallback for people who cannot receive the main message.

Police may authorise phased movement rather than immediate reopening. Maintain restrictions around affected areas and preserve evidence.

Do not assume the all-clear means normal business can resume. Damaged systems, an ongoing cordon or staff welfare needs may keep the premises closed.

Reconcile occupant information from safe locations. Pass unresolved concerns to the responsible emergency-service lead rather than starting an informal search.

Provide welfare and record the incident

Offer practical support as soon as safe. Psychological first aid involves calm, appropriate assistance and access to further help, not forcing people to recount what happened.

Within the following 24 to 72 hours, make employee assistance programme access and other support clear. Continue support where people were absent, working remotely or indirectly affected.

Document the timeline, instructions, calls, access-control actions, injuries and responder handover. Preserve relevant CCTV and records through authorised procedures.

Hold an early operational debrief, followed by a structured lessons-learned review within two to four weeks. These are useful planning intervals, not universal statutory deadlines. Assign each corrective action an owner, due date and completion check.

Rehearse decisions, communications and changing conditions

A successful drill establishes more than how quickly a door closes. It should show whether people recognise the warning, make suitable decisions and communicate when the expected arrangements fail.

Run exercises frequently enough to maintain competence, with the interval based on risk, staff turnover and site complexity.

Vary the scenario and operating conditions

A proportionate programme of lockdown drills and other exercises could include quarterly contact and alert checks, a six-monthly decision exercise and an annual controlled practical drill. These intervals are a suggested starting point, not a legal schedule.

Vary the conditions across the programme. Test an external threat, an internal threat, an unavailable incident lead, a blocked route and a failed communication channel.

Include night staffing, agency workers, visitors and accessibility arrangements over time. A daytime exercise with every manager present leaves important assumptions untested.

Avoid surprise simulations involving weapons, aggressive role-play or unexplained emergency messages. Coordinate exercises with building management and relevant monitoring arrangements to prevent unnecessary alarm or emergency calls.

Turn findings into completed changes

Record notification failures, delayed decisions, inaccessible areas, contradictory instructions and unresolved occupant information. Include what staff found unclear, not only what the exercise organiser expected.

Use relevant security vulnerability assessments to examine weaknesses affecting protective areas, access controls and alternative routes.

Assign corrective actions and test material changes again. Updating a document does not prove that a faulty alert route now works.

Review the plan after incidents, major layout changes, new systems, different operating hours or revised official guidance. Refresh role briefings before expecting staff to apply the revised procedure.

Frequently asked questions

What are the four main lockdown methods?

NPSA identifies one-way, two-way, partial and zonal lockdown. They describe how access is restricted, not a mandatory sequence of escalation.

A workplace may combine methods, but door controls must remain compatible with the assessed escape and fire-safety arrangements.

What is the difference between lockdown and an active-threat response?

Lockdown is an organisational protective measure involving access, movement and communication. An active-threat response concerns the immediate actions needed by someone exposed to danger.

Run, Hide, Tell remains relevant even when no building-wide lockdown has been announced. Staff should not wait for a manager before using a safe escape route.

Who can declare a workplace lockdown?

The written plan should authorise a named incident lead, duty manager or Chief Warden, with trained deputies covering all operating hours.

Immediate protective action and a 999 call should not depend on reaching that person first. Staff need clear authority to warn others and withdraw from danger.

How often should lockdown procedures be practised?

There is no single drill frequency suitable for every UK workplace. Set intervals according to the risk assessment, workforce changes, premises complexity and exercise findings.

Combine short communication checks, decision exercises and controlled practical drills. Rehearse changes that materially affect how people receive instructions or reach safety.

Make the plan work under actual conditions

A workplace lockdown plan should establish when restrictions reduce danger, who controls them and how people remain able to respond when conditions change. Its value depends on usable decisions, supported by accessible instructions and tested controls.

Assign the outstanding actions, rehearse the difficult scenarios and record what still fails. A plan is ready for use when the people on the relevant shift can carry it out, including when the normal manager, system or route is unavailable.